1923 Union Pacific Railroad Wreck Rawlins Wyoming 3 Original Photographs

1923 Union Pacific Railroad Wreck Rawlins Wyoming 3 Original Photographs UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD Collision between a freight train and a switch engine at Rawlins Wyoming on September 12 1923 which resulted in the death of one employee and the injury of three employees This accident was caused by extra 5003 running away on a descending grade on account of the air brakes not being in operation throughout the train for which the conductor and engineman are responsible This accident occurred on a double track line over which trains are operated by time table train orders and an automatic block signal system The point of accident was 600 feet east of the station at Rawlins Approaching this point from the west the track is tangent for about 3,000 feet while the grade is generally level or descending for a distance of approximately 7 miles the maximum being 0.82 per cent The weather was clear at the time of the accident which occurred at about 6.15 am. Eastbound freight train extra 5003 had tied up at Hadsell 7 miles from Rawlins on account of the so called 16 hour law and a relief crew took charge of the train at 3.25 am to bring it into Rawlins Extra 5003 which consisted of 45 cars and a caboose was then standing on an ascending grade of 0.77 per cent The train could not be started and after some delay it was discovered that the supply of coal was getting low the loosening of a slide in the stoker having allowed about 1 tons of coal to sift through to the ground It was decided to cut off the engine for the purpose of shoveling this coal back into the tender and the conductor went to the rear of the engine and closed the angle cock on the head car but was unable to operate the uncoupling lever on that car He said he then reopened the angle cock without trying the uncoupling lever on the tender went to the rear of the first car closed both angle cocks and parted the train at that point The engine and first car were then moved to where the coal had come out on the ground it was shoveled into the tender and the engine and car recoupled to the train Soon afterwards another train was flagged and assisted extra 5003 in starting but without any test of the air brakes having been made At Ferris 3.8 miles from Hadsell a running air brake test is required and it was when the engineman made this test at a speed of about 25 miles an hour that he discovered the brakes were not working through the train and realized that the train was not under control It continued toward Rawlins and while traveling at a speed of 35 or 40 miles an hour collided with switch engine 4464 the crew of which saw the runaway train approaching and were endeavoring to back 35 cars off the main track at a crossover at that point.Both engines were derailed but remained upright considerably damaged Fifteen cars in the train of extra 5003 were derailed six being practically demolished one of the cars being handled by switch engine 4464 was demolished and several others damaged The employee killed was the head brakeman of extra 5003 An examination of the air brakes on the undamaged portion of the train showed that they had not been in use further evidence to this effect being the statements of the conductor and flagman that the gauge in the caboose did not show any train line pressure when they first noticed it and it seems probable that this condition was due to the failure of the conductor to open one of the angle cocks Both the conductor and engineman stated it was not customary to comply with the rule which requires that an air brake test be made when for any reason the train is parted or the train cut in two while the engineman who had been relieved at Hadsell said he did not always make the test unless there was a doubt in his mind as to whether the air brakes were working throughout the train The rule as it is worded makes no exceptions a test is required whenever the train line has been parted Had this rule been obeyed the fact that the train line was not open throughout the train would have been discovered in time to have averted the accident If it is customary to ignore the rule a dangerous condition exists for which the operating officers are responsible and which they should take immediate steps to correct.